

## Presentation to CTLA 2014 Lac-Mégantic derailment

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Member, Transportation Safety Board of Canada Halifax, NS, 26 September 2014



### **Outline**

- About the TSB
- What happened that night?
- TSB recommendations
- What needs to change?
- Conclusions

### **About the TSB**


**Mission:** To advance transportation safety in the marine, pipeline, rail, and air modes of transportation that are under federal jurisdiction by:

- conducting independent investigations
- identifying safety deficiencies
- identifying causes and contributing factors
- making recommendations
- making our reports public



### **TSB Offices**

- Head Office is in Gatineau, Quebec
- The Engineering Laboratory is in Ottawa, Ontario
- Regional offices are located across the country to allow investigators to quickly reach the scene of an accident:



- Vancouver, British Columbia
- · Calgary, Alberta
- Edmonton, Alberta
- · Winnipeg, Manitoba
- Toronto, Ontario
- Montréal, Quebec
- Québec, Quebec
- Halifax, Nova Scotia




### The accident



### **MMA** territory

#### MONTREAL, MAINE & ATLANTIC RAILWAY LTD.



### **Train securement in Nantes**




### **Brakes**



### Why did the train run away?



### Path of the train




### Animation — Sequence of events in the Lac-Mégantic derailment and fire

### Why was there so much damage?




### Tank cars



### How could this have happened?

- What is SMS?
- MMA's safety culture
- Transport Canada oversight





### **TSB** recommendations

Recommendation		Status
R14-05 (August 2014)	Transport Canada must take a more hands-on role when it comes to railways' safety management systems—making sure not just that they exist, but that they are working and that they are effective.	NEW!
R14-04 (August 2014)	Canadian railways must put in place additional physical defences to prevent runaways.	NEW!
R14-03 (January 2014)	Emergency response assistance plans must be created for routes where large volumes of liquid hydrocarbons, like oil, are shipped.	Fully Satisfactory (June 2014)
R14-02 (January 2014)	Railway companies should conduct strategic route planning and enhance train operations for all trains carrying dangerous goods.	Satisfactory Intent (June 2014)
R14-01 (January 2014)	Enhanced protection standards must be put in place for Class 111 tank cars.	Satisfactory in Part (July 2014)

### "This must never happen again."

To prevent an accident like this from reoccurring, the combined efforts of the following parties are necessary:

- Transport Canada
- railway companies
- shippers
- tank car manufacturers
- refineries in Canada and the United States

### "What needs to change? The entire way we look at blame."

- Pointing fingers doesn't prevent the next accident.
- For complex systems, relying only on a rules-based culture isn't enough.
- What's needed are defences in depth.



### Conclusions

- This accident had 18 causes and contributing factors.
- Complex systems require more than just relying on rulescompliance; they need defences in depth.
- TSB will continue to monitor the implementation of recommendations—and report publicly on any progress.





### Questions?

# Canada